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Abstract
We model knowledge-trading coalitions in which the transfer of tacit knowl-
edge is unveri…able and requires face-to-face contact, making spatial proximity
important. When there are su¢cient “complementarities” in knowledge ex-
change, successful exchange is facilitated if …rms can meet in a central loca-
tion, thereby economizing on travel costs. When complementarities are small,
however, a central location may be undesirable because it is more vulnerable
to cheating than a structure involving bilateral travel between …rms. We be-
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11 Introduction
It is widely recognized that the creation and dissemination of knowledge is central to
modern economic growth, particularly in high-technology sectors such as computing,
biotechnology, and telecommunications. How best to organize …rms and industries to
facilitate this process is a topic of ongoing research interest. In many industries, it is
impractical for each …rm to generate all relevant knowledge within its own vertically
integrated structure, and the exchange of knowledge is central to industry success.
This fact poses a serious organizational problem because knowledge is a di¢cult good
on which to contract. It may be virtually impossible to specify in advance the
nature of the knowledge to be exchanged, or to verify ex post whether the promised
knowledge has in fact been delivered.
1 Contracting di¢culties are especially severe
for tacit knowledge, that is, know-how or skills that are embodied in human capital
and di¢cult to codify.2
Tacit knowledge takesa variety of forms. In a manufacturing setting, learning-by-
doing is critical in many industries. For example, the fabrication of silicon wafers is
central to modern semiconductors, and is a delicate art that is only gradually learned
on the job. Managerial processes more generally also involve tacit knowledge. While
much has been written about total quality management, Womack (1991) points out
that American automobile manufacturers took years to learn the process from the
Japanese, and only began to develop mastery through joint ventures with Toyota and
Honda.
3 Critical to these and other examplesis thatsharingtacitknowledge requires
face-to-face contact; reading about the skills involved is not su¢cient.
When meetings are essential to knowledge exchange, spatial proximity plays a
natural role in determining the cost of sharing knowledge. Marshall (1895) famously
stressed that knowledge spillovers are a driving force for the agglomeration of in-
dustries. More recently, Saxenian (1994) and Porter (1998) have provided engaging
1Aydogan (2002) studies empirically the governance structures used by Silicon Valley …rms to
support the transfer of knowledge.
2Polanyi (1958) provides the seminal account of tacit knowledge and its characteristics.
3An example of tacitknowledge within the economicsprofession istheartof modelspeci…cation in
econometrics. Welsch (1986, p. 405) puts matters bluntly: “Even with a vast arsenal of diagnostics,
it is very hard to write down rules that can be used to guide a data analysis. So much is really
subjective and subtle...A great deal of what we teach in applied statistics is not written down, let
alone in a form suitable for formal encoding. It is just simply ‘lore’.”
2accounts of the role of spatial clustering in creating regional economic advantages.4
There is also a growing empirical literature documenting the importance of spatial
proximity for knowledge spillovers between …rms. For example, Ja¤e, Trajtenberg
and Henderson (1993) …nd that patent citations are signi…cantly more likely to come
from within the same country, state, and even metropolitan area than would be pre-
dicted by the geographical dispersion of similar research. Audretsch and Feldman
(1996) …nd thatinnovative activity, as measured by technological innovations actually
introduced, tends to be more geographically clustered in industries that place greater
reliance on research and development and on skilled labor.
There are several possible explanations for the observed importance of geograph-
ical clustering in knowledge-intensive industries. The most familiar of these is the
notion of localized knowledge “spillovers,” but this is more a description than an ex-
planation.5 Underlyingtransmission mechanismspresumably rely upon interpersonal
sharing of knowledge, which may occur through a variety of means, including casual
conversation in bars after work, rapid employee turnover, and intentional meetings
between employees of di¤erent …rms. The survey work of Levin et al. (1987) docu-
ments the importance of interpersonal communication as a means for …rms to acquire
external knowledge. In particular, the use of publications and technical meetings,
informal conversations, and hiring away employees from other…rms are all important,
and their use tends to be highly correlated. Leamer and Storper (2001) argue that
proximity is an important source of competitiveness in large part because face-to-face
meetings are necessary for the exchange of complex knowledge.
The foregoing work, while intriguing, has not presented formal models of the role
of spatial proximity in knowledge-based industry clusters. Our goal is to develop a
simple dynamic model in which competing …rms trade tacit knowledge, the transfer
of which is possible only when individuals meet face-to-face.6 As a result, geograph-
ical location becomes essential to the analysis. For simplicity, we do not model the
research process, but rather assume that in each period each …rm costlessly obtains
knowledge that is valuable in achieving a cost reduction. This allows us to maintain
4According to Porter (1998, p. 77), “[c]lusters are geographical concentrations of interconnected
companies and institutions in a particular …eld.”
5De Bondt (1996) provides an interesting synthesis of the industrial organization literature on
spillovers and their implications for innovative activity.
6Malmberg and Maskell (2001, p. 11) point out that “most well-known examples of industry
agglomeration are obviously based on the horizontal dimension, since they are made up of several
…rms operating in the same industry.”
3a focus on spatial proximity and the process of knowledge exchange. We construct
a Cournot quantity game in which each of N …rms is represented by a single indi-
vidual who must decide whether to travel to meetings with the other members of a
coalition over time, with the distance between each pair of …rms equal to d. In each
period, …rms decide whether to travel to meet with other member of the coalition,
and if a meeting occurs, whether to truthfully reveal their own knowledge. We ana-
lyze the equilibrium strategies for a one-shot and a repeated Cournot output game.
Following Eaton and Eswaran (1997), we consider expulsion from the coalition as the
punishment mechanism in the repeated game.
We consider two possible organizational structures for exchange, a centralized
meeting location and bilateral travel. The “central location” structure is possible
only if a given …rm’s knowledge can be conveyed without being in the presence of the
…rm’s actual facilities. This setting corresponds to the presence of a joint facility
that can be shared by all …rms, akin to the “foundry” model for semiconductor
production.7 This setting also applies to an industry in which tacit knowledge is
entirely independent of any physical facilities, and hence meetings can be held at
a convenient centrally located hotel or conference center. The “bilateral travel”
structure is relevant when a …rm’s tacit knowledge is intimately tied to its actual
physical facilities. This is likely to be the case, for example, for benchmarking of
complex manufacturing processes, e.g. total quality management (TQM), in which
plant visits appeared tobe necessary forAmericans to truly comprehend the Japanese
management approach.
The impact of knowledge exchange on costs depends on the extent to which the
knowledge of the two parties is complementary. In strictly “independent” knowledge
exchange, one …rm can passively absorb the knowledge presented by another without
revealing his own knowledge, and there are no joint gains from mutual exchange.
In “complementary” knowledge exchange, there is an interaction that generates new
insights and joint bene…ts not recognized by either party prior to the encounter, but
only if both parties actively exchange their knowledge. In this type of exchange,
both parties gain from a mutual revelation of information, and the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts. We show that the balance between these two forms
7See National Research Council (2003) for further discussion of this model, especially the section
on the Taiwanese industry.
4of knowledge has important implications for the sustainability of knowledge trad-
ing. In particular, knowledge sharing may be an equilibrium—even in a one-shot
game—if there is enough complementarity in the knowledge exchange process. In
general, greater complementarities facilitate the exchange of knowledge across greater
distances, thereby supporting the formation of successful clusters.
Interestingly, we …nd that the advantages of particular organizational structures
may be related to the extent of complementarities in knowledge exchange. When
complementarities are large, knowledge exchange is facilitated when …rms have the
ability to meet in a central location, thereby economizing on travel costs. When
complementarities are small, however, a tradeo¤ emerges in the use of a central loca-
tion. While the structure reduces travel costs, it is also more vulnerable to cheating
than a structure involving bilateral travel between pairs of …rms. With a central
location, a …rm can opportunistically cheat all other …rms in the industry by travel-
ing to the center, passively absorbing knowledge from all its rivals, and withholding
its own knowledge. In the bilateral travel structure, however, a …rm can only cheat
a subset of the other …rms in its industry before its cheating behavior is identi…ed
and punished. When rival …rms visit the cheater before it visits them, rivals learn
that the cheater is withholding its knowledge, and reciprocate by withholding their
knowledge from it. This makes cheating less pro…table than in the central location
structure.
We are aware of only two other papers thatattempt to formalize the role of spatial
proximity in knowledge exchange. Cooper (2001) models information transmission
via job mobility, and …nds that contractual clauses restricting mobility are generally
welfare-decreasing. Berliant et al. (2000) develop a model in which individualssearch
for others with complementary knowledge; they derive equilibria in which the extent
of agglomeration is endogenously determined.8
In the following section, we present our basic model of knowledge exchange in an
oligopoly, analyze the stage game involving travel to meetings, knowledge exchange,
and output choice, and lay out the structure of the repeated game. In section 3, we
study the knowledge-sharing equilibria that can be sustained when all …rms travel
8Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) adopt a social network approach, modeling in detail the
formation of links between …rms that allow for knowledge sharing, and assessing the equilibrium
structure of such networks. Eaton and Eswaran (1997) study theperformanceof technology-trading
coalitions that ostracize cheaters while the remaining members continue to cooperate. Neither of
these papers considers the role of spatial proximity or knowledge complementarities, however.
5to a central location. Section 4 studies the case where pairs of …rms travel to one
another’s facilities to exchange knowledge; in both sections 3 and 4 we emphasize the
relationship between knowledge complementarity and the sustainability of knowledge
sharing. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Knowledge Exchange in an Oligopoly
In this section we lay out a simple model of knowledge exchange in an oligopoly. We
focus on the case where all …rms in the industry are involved in sharing information
with one another.9 In each period, each …rm generates some new tacit knowledge
through a costless and unmodeled process. This knowledge can be transferred to
others, but only through face-to-face contact. Furthermore, whether such knowl-
edge was transferred cannot be veri…ed by a court, and hence is non-contractible.
Knowledge transmission requires that at least one party to the exchange travel to
a meeting with the other party, incurring a travel cost dependent on the nature of
the knowledge (as described in more detail below in the subsection on Travel) and
the distance between them. At the meeting, each …rm chooses whether to share its
knowledge with the other. Let xij 2 f0; 1g be Firmi’s report toFirm j, where xij = 1
indicates sharing and xij = 0 indicates withholding. We will denote by x the array
of the …rms’ choices.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we allow for two types of conversations dur-
ing meetings. One type involves “independent” knowledge exchange: the listener
simply absorbs what the speaker presents, and the content received is independent
of any comments by the listener. The second type of exchange involves “comple-
mentarities,” and is interactive and collaborative. In this type of interaction, there
is a dynamic give and take in which new insights may be generated that were not
9Most papers on knowledge sharing assume that all …rms within an industry are involved in
knowledge sharing. For example, this is the assumption made by Kamien, Muller and Zang (1990)
and Cooper (2001). Some papers, such as Morasch (1995), consider only two …rms, so that if
knowledge sharingoccurs, it is necessarily done throughout the whole industry. Eaton and Eswaran
(1997) point out via a numerical example that it is possible for multiple coalitions to emerge, though
they do not present general conditions under which this is likely to occur. Their main thrust,
however, is to show that cooperation is better supported by “stacked reversion” (in which a …rm
that “cheats” on its partners within a coalition is permanently ejected) than by “Nash reversion”
(in which the coalition dissolves entirely if a …rm cheats). We build on their insights and assume
the punishment for cheating is ejection from, rather than dissolution of, the coalition.
6recognized by either party prior to the meeting; co-authors on research papers are
familiar with this phenomenon. We model these two types of exchange in di¤erent
ways. Let each …rm’s unit cost function be ci(x) = ﬁ ¡ ﬂ
P
j6=i xji ¡ ￿
P
j6=i xijxji.
Note that …rm i’s own cost-reducing knowledge is already re‡ected in the parameter
ﬁ: “Independent” exchange is captured through the second term, involving the co-
e¢cient ﬂ; while exchange involving complementaries is captured in the third term,
involving coe¢cient￿: Exchange bene…ts from complementaritiescan only be realized
if both …rms involved share their knowledge. One way to think about the role of
complementarities is to recognize them as an example of supermodularity.10 As we
will see, the relative importance of these two types of exchange for cost reduction has
interesting implications for the sustainability of knowledge trading.
In the remainder of this section we …rst present the basic structure of the stage
game, and then discuss the repeated game.
2.1 The Structure of the Stage Game
We divide the stage game into three parts. First, …rms decide whether to travel to
meetings for the purpose of exchanging knowledge. Second, …rms at a meeting decide
whether to share their knowledge, which can generate cost reductions. Third, …rms
play a Cournot output game. As is standard in such games, we solve the three parts
in reverse chronological order using backward induction.
2.1.1 The Output Game
There are N …rms. They compete in a homogeneous-products Cournot oligopoly.
Let qi be the output chosen by …rm i, and Q =
PN
i=1 qi be total industry output.
Demand is given by P(Q) = a¡bQ. De…ne Q¡i = Q¡qi. Suppose ci(x) = c for all
i 6= j, while cj(x) = cj for …rm j. Firm j’s pro…t function is …j = (P(Q) ¡cj)qj: It
is straightforward to …nd reaction functions, and solve them for equilibrium output
levels q¤







(a ¡2c + cj)2
b(N +1)2
10The concept of supermodularity has been employed in a number of economic models. For
example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) exploit supermodularities to develop an economic theory








[a ¡Ncj + (N ¡1)c]2
b(N + 1)2 :
2.1.2 Knowledge Exchange
Given they can anticipate the results of Cournot competition, …rms must decide
whether to participate in knowledge exchange in each of their pairwise encounters
with other …rms. We analyze a representative meeting, assuming that one …rm or
the other has already traveled to the meeting place. In the following subsection, we
study the …rms’ decisions whether or not to travel.
Let us suppose that in each period, all …rms meet with all other members of
the industry. Since the …rms are symmetric, a given …rm will treat all other …rms
the same with regard to its decision whether to share its knowledge. In other words,
xij = xik, for all j 6= k. Fromour preceding work, we know that if all …rms participate
in knowledge exchange, then each has unit cost ccoop ´ ﬁ ¡ (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡ 1). If all
…rms but j exchange knowledge, and j withholds its knowledge from all others in the
industry, then ci = ﬁ ¡(ﬂ +￿)(N ¡2) for all i 6= j and cj = ﬁ ¡ﬂ(N ¡1). We will
say that complementarities are “large” if ccoop < cj:
Because the exchange of tacit knowledge is non-contractible, conventional wisdom
suggests that exchange cannot succeed in a one-shot setting, although it may be
possible in a repeated context. Indeed, this is the case in the model of Eaton and
Eswaran (1997). The following lemma identi…es the Nash equilibria in the subgame
involving knowledge sharing and Cournot competition.
Lemma 1: Suppose all …rms engage in meetings with one another. If knowledge
complementarities are small, i.e. ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), then the only Nash equilibrium
for the remainder of the stage game is for all …rms to withhold their knowledge. If
knowledge complementarities are large, i.e. if ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), then there are two
Nash equilibria, one with no knowledge sharing and one with knowledge sharing by all
…rms.
Proof: See the Appendix.
It is instructive to compare this result to the argument of Arora (1996), who
8also shows that the exchange of tacit knowledge can be supported in a one-shot
game, but only if it can be tied contractually to the exchange of another input,
such as hardware, whose transfer is veri…able. Our analysis di¤ers from his in that
we make no use of veri…able inputs nor of formal contracts. We are concerned
with a setting where both parties possess tacit knowledge that is of value to the
other party, and where the complementarity is an innate part of the knowledge the
parties possess. Indeed, we …nd that when such complementarities are present,
a formal contract for knowledge exchange is unnecessary if complementarities are
strong enough. Nevertheless, there still exists a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in
which no sharing takes place, since research complementarities confer no bene…ts on
the sharing …rm if rivals are withholding knowledge.11
2.1.3 Travel
We turn next to the …rms’ decisions whether to travel to meetings for the purpose of
knowledge exchange. Ourspeci…cation oftravel costsmakes use of the “spokes”model
of location proposed by Chen and Riordan (2003), which generalizes the standard
Hotelling model of two …rms at opposite ends of a line segment. Imagine N …rms
spread evenly around a circle of diameter d, each of which is connected to the “hub”
of the wheel by a “spoke” of length d=2: Two …rms can agree to meet at a “central
location,” namely the hub of the wheel, in which case each …rm incurs travel cost d=2,
normalizing the unit cost of travel to one. Travel by …rm i to the facilities of …rm j
requires traveling along the spoke connecting …rm i to the hub, and then along the
spoke that connects the hub to …rm j, for a total travel distance of d. Thus, in this
model, all …rms are equidistant from one another.12
The amountof travel required for knowledge exchange depends upon the nature of
the knowledge involved. We consider two organizational structures which we denote
11The sharing equilibrium may be more “reasonable” than not sharing when the complementarity
parameter, ￿; is largerelativetoﬂ: Foratwo-person game, onecan show thatthesharingequilibrium
is risk-dominant when ￿ is large relative to ﬂ: (See Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for development of
the concept of risk dominance.) Intuitively, this means that sharing is preferred even when one is
uncertain whatone’srival will play. Generalizing the notion of risk dominancetoour N-person game
would require the use of combinatorial techniques, however, and we leave this for future research.
The point we make here is simply that the sharing equilibrium can be justi…ed as reasonable, even
in a one-shot game, under certain conditions.
12For simplicity, we normalize d to be the round-trip cost of travel.
9using the variable ￿: 1) Exchange at a central location (￿ = C); and 2) Exchange
that must be conducted through bilateral travel because tacit knowledge is embodied
in location-speci…c processes and structures (￿ = B): The …rst of these structures
corresponds roughly to Markusen’s (1996) notion of a “hub-and-spoke” structure,
which is associated with the organization of the automobile and bio-pharmaceutical
industries, or a “state-anchored district,” in which a key research facility, government
laboratory, military base orstate-supported university serves as the central hub. The
second structure is closer to the traditional Marshallian industrial district often asso-
ciated with Silicon Valley and the “Third Italy.”13 The notion that tacit knowledge is
embodied in products, processes and practices is commonly acknowledged by scholars
of innovation and industrial clusters.14 However, to the best of our knowledge, our
paper is …rst to formally model the implications of this distinction for the spatial
organization of industry.
We will represent the per-…rm travel costs in each regime by T(d; ￿): The re-
lationship between knowledge regime and travel cost is as follows. In the case of
travel to a central location, all …rms can meet at the hub, each incurring travel costs
T(d;C) = d=2: Once they are at the hub, the …rms’ representatives engage in a series
of pairwise meetings that have no additional marginal cost. In the case of bilateral
travel, full cooperation requires that each …rm must travel to all other …rms, for total
travel cost of T(d; B) = d(N ¡1):
15
Note that the results of Lemma 1 concern the behavior of …rms once they are in
a meeting with another …rm. Further analysis is needed to determine whether …rms
have incentives to incur the costs of travelling to a meeting for purposes of knowledge
exchange. In a one-shot game, …rms will never travel if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1); since the
unique equilibrium outcome for meetings is for both …rms to withhold knowledge.
When ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1); however, travel may be pro…table.
Throughout the paper we are interested in when knowledge-sharing outcomes can
be supported as non-cooperative equilibria. One of the complexities that arise when
13We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we consider the central location structure.
14See Lipsey (2002) for a detailed discussion of alternative forms of embodied technological knowl-
edge.
15We have also analyzed the case where it is su¢cient for one …rm in a pair to travel to the other
…rm’s facilities, and both …rms can exchange knowledge at this one meeting. The results are similar
to the case of bilateral travel, however, and since we felt bilateral travel is more common in practice,
we have streamlined the paper by eliminating the discussion of one-way travel.
10spatial proximity is included in a model of knowledge exchange is that one must ad-
dressexplicitly the multiple waysin which …rms can deviate froma sharingagreement.
In particular, there are two dimensions on which deviation can occur: whether a …rm
travels to other …rms when it is expected to, and whether a …rm shares knowledge
once it is in a meeting with another …rm. We will use the notation “S” to indicate
that a …rm shares knowledge, and “W” to indicate that it withholds knowledge; we
will let “T” indicate that a …rm travels, and “NT” indicate that it does not. With
a central location, there are four possible strategies: “S=T”, “S=NT”, “W=T”, and
“W=NT.” Clearly, “S=T” is the fully cooperative outcome. We will denote a given
exchange strategy in the case of a central location by ￿ 2 fS=T;S=NT; W=T; W=NT g:
(The strategies for bilateral travel are more complex, and are described in section 4.)
Which of the possible deviations is most pro…table will depend on various parameters
of the model, as we will see below.
In the remainder of the paper we will be concerned with identifying the maximum
distance across which …rms can be located and still support knowledge exchange.
We will use the notation d￿
￿ to be the “one-shot distance threshold” for knowledge
exchange, that is, the maximum distance that will support knowledge exchange in a
one-shot game in organizational structure ￿ with exchange strategy ￿; where ￿ = C
indicates the use of a central location, and ￿ = B indicates bilateral travel. Similarly,
we will let D
￿
￿ be the “repeated game distance threshold,” that is, the maximum
distance that will support knowledge exchange in a repeated game in structure ￿ 2
fC; Bg and exchange strategy ￿: For both the one-shot and repeated games, we will
use the notations d￿ and D￿ without a superscript to indicate the minimum distance
threshold when …rms play their optimal strategies.
2.2 Knowledge Exchange in a Repeated Game
In studying the repeated game, we will emphasize the case where ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1);
since cooperation is sustainable even in the one-shot game otherwise. When comple-
mentarities are small, that is if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1); knowledge exchange will not occur
in a one-shot game but exchange may nevertheless be possible in an ongoing trading
relationship. In a repeated setting, with discount factor –, the net present value of
cooperating forever is simply
V
coop(d; ￿) = […
coop ¡T(d; ￿)]=(1¡–):
11If all …rms fully cooperate in knowledge exchange, that is, they travel to meetings
and share knowledge atmeetings, then each …rmhasunitcostccoop = ﬁ¡(ﬂ+￿)(N¡1)
and the cooperative payo¤ in the stage game (gross of travel costs) is
…
coop =
[a¡ﬁ + (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡1)]2
b(N +1)2 :
We will assume that if …rm j cheats on a knowledge sharing agreement today,
he will be detected within one period, and will be ostracized by the rest of the
industry forever after. Eaton and Eswaran (1997) refer to this form of punishment as
“stacked reversion,” and explore in detail the technical aspects of its use as a means
of supporting cooperation in a supergame. The potential concern is that once a
single defector is ostracized, the remaining coalition members might have incentives
to defect sequentially, thereby causing the coalition to break down. If this is the
case, then the only sustainable punishment mechanism is the threat that the entire
coalition will be dissolved (“Nash reversion”) if one member ever cheats.16 Eaton
and Eswaran conclude that when costs fall linearly with the number of members in
a coalition, as in our case, there exists a critical discount factor such that stacked
reversion is viable for discount factors above this critical level. They are unable to
provide an analytical result, but reach the conclusion by using Mathematica to derive
a power series approximation for the critical discountfactor, and then …nding that the
approximation is increasing in the size of the coalition. For our case, which includes
knowledge complementarities and spatial proximity, it is di¢cult to determine how
the power series approximation changes with N. Thus, we focus on the case where
– is large.
When ostracismisthe punishmentimposed bythe cooperating…rmson a “cheater,”
we can specify the punishment payo¤ as follows. If …rm j is caught cheating and
ostracized, then …rm j’s cost in the future will be cj = ﬁ, while the other …rms in the
16We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that an interesting extension of the analysis
would allow for sequential knowledge trades each period. In this case, as longas knowledge were not
embodied in a particular …rm’s facilities, then each successive …rm would be able to pass along its
knowledge, along with that of all the other previous …rms. The …rm that is the last to trade could
extract all the information from all other industry members through a single act of cheating. This
would reduce the cost of cheating, and make knowledge sharing more di¢cult to sustain. While
this is an intriguing notion, it raises questions that go beyond the scope of the present paper.
12industry have costs ci = ﬁ ¡(ﬂ +￿)(N ¡2). De…ne
e c = ﬁ + (ﬂ +￿)(N ¡1)(N ¡2):







Throughout the remainder of the paper we will assume that an ostracized …rm
continues to have strictly positive output and pro…ts, and is not forced to exit the
industry. For future reference, it is worth noting that
…
coop =
[a ¡e c + (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡1)2]2
b(N +1)2 : (2)
3 Central Location
In this section we study the case where tacit knowledge is exchanged at a single cen-
tral location. This structure can encompass a variety of di¤erent situations. First,
it can represent a situation where tacit knowledge takes the form of pure human
capital, and hence is independent of the facilities of the organization within which it
exists. That is, its transmission is not tied to the use or availability of particular
pieces of equipment. Thus, while industry members need to engage in face-to-face
meetings, the location for such meetings need not be the facilities of an industry
member. A hotel or convention center is adequate for meetings involving this form
of knowledge. As a result, it is feasible for all industry members to travel to a central
location to exchange knowledge. Second, one can think of the analysis in this section
as applying to an industry with Markusen’s (1996) “hub-and-spoke” structure or her
“state-anchored district” structure. In either of these structures, there is a central
facility that serves as a common hub to which all …rms travel in order to exchange
knowledge. A university can serve as such a central location. Alternatively, as Mur-
phy (1991) explains, the central location could be a non-university facility, as when
the Microelectronics and Computer Cooperative (MCC) created a joint research lab,
and built it in a location where it would not advantage any member over others for
accessing knowledge from the lab. A somewhat similar situation emerged in Taiwan,
13through the notion of a “foundry” for the production of semiconductors. In 1987,
the Taiwanese government provided substantial funding to create the Taiwan Semi-
conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which served as a central production
facility that could be utilized by a large number of smaller “fab-less” design com-
panies, who were thereby freed from the need to invest in their own manufacturing
facilities.17
3.1 Equilibria in the Stage Game
If ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1); then from Lemma 1 it cannot possibly be pro…table to travel
in a one-shot game, since …rms will withhold knowledge at meetings. Assuming
￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1); however, then if a …rm travels to the central location, it will share
knowledge with all other …rms present. Its travel costs are T(d;C) = d=2: Then
the cooperative payo¤ is …coop ¡d=2. Alternatively, if the …rm chooses not to travel,
it obtains no knowledge from any other …rm. We will suppose that all other …rms
continue to cooperate. Then if …rm j chooses not to travel, its cost will be cj = ﬁ,
while the other …rms in the industry have costsci = ﬁ¡(ﬂ+￿)(N¡2). Note thatthis
is exactly the same as the cost con…guration obtained when …rm j is ostracized, so
pro…ts for a …rm that chooses not to travel, while the rest of the industry cooperates,
are simply …ostracize:
Itisstraightforward tode…ne the threshold distance dC(a; b; N;ﬁ; ﬂ;￿) such thatin
the one-shot game travel is pro…table for distances below the threshold. Suppressing







Thus, the exchange of tacit knowledge is an equilibrium even in a one-shot game
with strictly positive travel costs, as long as there is su¢cient complementarity to
the knowledge being shared and travel costs are not too great. We summarize our
analysis of the stage game in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: When knowledge exchange is conducted at a central location, if com-
plementarities are small, i.e. ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1); then the unique equilibrium of the stage
game is that no travel and no knowledge sharing occurs. If complementarities are
17National Research Council (2003), pp. 149-160.
14large, however, i.e. ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1); then knowledge exchange with travel to a central
location is an equilibrium in the stage game if d · dC:
We can gain further insight into the determinants of the travel threshold by ex-
panding the expression for dC; which yields
dC =
2(ﬂ +￿)(N ¡1)2
b(N + 1)2 [2(a¡ﬁ) ¡(ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡1)(N ¡3)]:
Di¤erentiation allows us to identify how changes in the underlying parameters of
the model a¤ect the distance across which knowledge exchange can be supported.
Outward shifts of the the demand curve, i.e. increases in parameter a; increase the
threshhold distance for knowledge exchange. Similarly, reductions in production
cost ﬁ expand the distance across which knowledge can be exchanged. In addition,
when the demand curve becomes steeper, i.e. b decreases, the threshhold distance
increases. Furthermore, when the cost-reduction parameters ﬂ or ￿ increase the
threshhold distance also increases, as long as N · 2 +
p
(a ¡ﬁ)=(ﬂ +￿): Speaking
broadly, these comparative statics indicate that …rms can cooperate over greater
distances when the available market surplus—either through expanded demand or
reduced cost—isgreater. Note thatin this case the parameters ﬂ and ￿ have identical
e¤ects on the distance threshold, but this will not be true for the repeated game. The
e¤ect of N on the distance threshold is more complex; it increases with N up to a
point, and then decreases.
3.2 Equilibria in the Repeated Game
In the supergame, a …rm has the choice to cooperate forever, thereby earning payo¤
V
coop(d; C) = […
coop ¡d=2]=(1¡–):
Alternatively, a …rm can decide to cheat on the sharing agreement. If ￿ >
ﬂ=(N ¡1), then Lemma 1 shows that a …rm will share knowledge if it travels to the
central location, so cheating can only be accomplished by not traveling in period t,











15If ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), there is an alternative cheating strategy available in which a
…rm travels to the central location but does not share knowledge. In this case, a …rm
that decides to deviate from full cooperation will withhold knowledge at the meeting,
since it will be ostracized by other …rms in the future and it is not worthwhile to
share information in the present period. If all …rms but j fully cooperate, then
ci = ﬁ ¡ (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡ 2) for all i 6= j. Firm j; however, takes advantage of the
knowledge shared by all N ¡ 1 other …rms, leaving it with cost cj = ﬁ ¡ﬂ(N ¡1):




[a ¡e c +ﬂN(N ¡1)]2
b(N +1)2 : (4)
It is easy to see that …W=T > …ostracize; in addition, when ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1) it is
also the case that …
W=T > …












We characterize the threshold distance below which knowledge exchange can be
sustained in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For travel to a central location, knowledge exchange is an equi-
librium in the repeated game if
d < DC =
(







if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1)
:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that the magnitude of complementarities is critical to de-
termining the spatial distance across which knowledge exchange can be supported,
since there is a kink in the expression for the distance threshold at the point where
￿ = ﬂ=(N ¡1): Note that at ￿ = ﬂ=(N ¡1) we have …coop = …W=T; so D
W=T
C = dC:




C < dC: Thus, the
distance threshold increases for ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1): The following Proposition considers
in more detail how DC is a¤ected by changes in ﬂ and ￿:
16Proposition 2: For travel to a central location, @DC=@￿ ¸ @DC=@ﬂ > 0; with
@DC=@￿ > @DC=@ﬂ for ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1): Furthermore, both @DC=@￿ and @DC=@ﬂ
are greater for ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1) than for ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1):
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 establishes several interesting facts about the case of travel to a
central location. Most importantly, knowledge exchange is sustainable across greater
distances when it is more e¤ective at reducing costs, whether knowledge exchange is
of the independent type orthe complementary type. However, the distance threshold
is more responsive to increases in complementarities than to increases in the value of
independent knowledge. Finally, the distance threshold is concave in both ﬂ and ￿:
The relation between ￿ and DC is illustrated in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
4 Bilateral Travel
We turn now to the case of tacit knowledge that is intimately tied to the processes
and equipment used at particular …rms’ facilities. This is the case for the types of
process improvements for which …rms like to benchmark their own progress.18 It
would be the case, for example, for total quality management, which took American
auto makers a decade to learn from the Japanese. In such settings, collective
routines, conventions, procedures or key leaders within …rms may become essential
repositories of knowledge. Visits to the facilities of other …rms become important
when knowledge is tacit, since a …rm’s representative can only communicate his tacit
knowledge e¤ectively on the premises of his own …rm. Thus, successful knowledge
exchange requires that both …rms travel to one another. As a result, full cooperation
requires that …rms incur per-period travel costs T(d; B) = d(N ¡1):
In this setting, knowledge complementarities cannot emerge until both …rms in a
pair have visited each others’ facilities. We will assume that within each stage, plant
visits occur sequentially, and that if …rm i …rst makes a visit to …rm j, it is able to
tell immediately upon leaving whether or not …rm j has shared its knowledge. Firm
18For an introduction to the practiceof benchmarking, see Jacobson and Hillkirk (1986) or Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit (1993).
17i can thus condition its sharing strategy with …rm j on …rm j’s sharing behavior.
Complementarities only develop if both …rms in sequence share their knowledge with
one another. We will assume that …rms in each pairwise combination are randomly
selected to travel …rst.
4.1 Equilibria in the Stage Game
If a…rmdecides to cheaton the sharingagreement, itcan do so by eithernottraveling,
not sharing, or both. Furthermore, it may adopt a di¤erent strategy when it is the
…rst …rm in a pair to travel as opposed to the second. Thus, we can characterize
a strategy in the stage game by a four-tuple expressing whether or not the …rm
will travel and/or subsequently share knowledge when it is the …rst traveler, and
whether it will share knowledge and/or travel when it is the second traveler. Let
t1
ij 2 fT=NTg be …rm i’s decision whether to travel to …rm j if …rm i is …rst to
travel, while t2
ij 2 fT=NTg is …rm i’s decision whether to travel to …rm j if …rm i
is second to travel. Similarly, x1
ij 2 fS=Wg is …rm i’s decision whether to share or
withhold knowledge with …rm j if …rm i travels …rst, while x2
ij 2 fS=Wg is …rm i’s
decision whether to share or withhold knowledge with …rm j if …rm i is second to
travel. Note that x1
ij can be conditioned upon …rm j’s previous sharing behavior in
the stage game, x2
ji; of course, x1
ij is trivially conditional upon …rm j’s decision to
travel, t
2
ji; since i’s willingness to share is irrelevant if j does not travel. Similarly, x
2
ij
is trivially conditional upon …rm j’s previous travel behavior in the stage game, t1
ji.
Finally, t2
ij can be meaningfully conditioned upon …rm j’s previous travel behavior in
the stage game, t1
ji. In general, then, a strategy for …rm i with regard to …rm j can






ji)): The strategy (T; S(S);S; T(T)) is thus the
fully cooperative strategy in which the …rm shares knowledge and travels regardless
of whether it moves …rst or second, as long as the other …rm is also playing the







ji to keep our notation as simple as possible.
As should be apparent, a general analysis of strategic interaction in the bilat-
eral travel game is potentially extremely complex, since there are sixty-four possible
strategies for each …rm in the stage game. Fortunately, most of them can be elim-
inated from consideration on the grounds that they are either dominated or cannot
be part of any subgame perfect equilibrium. For example, if t1
ij = NT; then x1
ij = S
is dominated because …rm i has no incentive to share knowledge once it has already
18destroyed any chance for achieving complementarities by refusing to travel. Sim-
ilarly, if x2
ij = W; then t2
ij = T cannot be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium
because …rm j has incentives to withhold knowledge once …rm i has destroyed any
chance for achieving complementarities by refusing to share. Finally, if x2
ij = S; then
t2
ij = NT is sub-optimal because the only reason for …rm i to share at …rst is that it
intends to travel in the second half of the period, in order to obtain complementarity
bene…ts. In addition, it is possible to eliminate some asymmetric strategies. For
example, the strategies (T; W; S; T) and (T;S;W; T) cannot possibly be optimal; if
complementarities are valuable enough to support sharing when i travels …rst, they
should also support sharing when i travels second, and conversely.
Proceeding with the foregoing logic, we can winnow down the setof internally con-
sistentpotentialequilibriumstrategiesto…ve: (T; S; S;T ); (NT; W; W; NT); (T; W; W; NT);
(T;S; W; NT ); and (NT; W; S; T): The …rst represents full cooperation, and the sec-
ond represents full non-cooperation. The third strategy takes advantage of the se-
quential nature of travel in this game, and involves “opportunistic plant visits” by
…rm i; in which …rm i travels to …rm j and absorbs knowledge, but withholds knowl-
edge when j visits. The fourth and …fth strategies generate equal payo¤s, and involve
“selective sharing” in which …rm i shares with half of its rivals and withholds from
the other half; such strategies could potentially be optimal if the bene…ts of sharing
with more …rms increased more slowly than the (linear) costs of traveling.
If ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), then even if …rm i shares its knowledge, …rm j will not share
if it is visited by …rm i. Knowing this, neither …rm will share; nor will either …rm
travel. The unique equilibrium strategy in the stage game is thus (NT; W; W;NT)
for all …rms.




Other strategies must be considered as possible equilibria, also. If all …rms fully
cooperate in knowledge exchange, that is, they travel to meetingsand share knowledge
atmeetings, then each …rmhas unitcostccoop = ﬁ¡(ﬂ+￿)(N¡1) and the cooperative
payo¤ in the stage game is …
T;S;S;T = …
coop: Strategy (T; W; W;NT) implies that
the …rm obtains no complementarities, but engages in opportunistic plant vists that
take knowledge from half of its partners, thereby achieving cost c = ﬁ ¡ﬂ(N ¡1)=2
while its cooperative rivals have cost c = ﬁ ¡(ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡2): It must travel to half




[a ¡e c+ ﬂN(N ¡1)=2]2
b(N + 1)2 :
Finally, the “selective sharing”strategy, which can be implemented as(T; S; W; NT)
or (NT;W; S; T) implies that the …rm obtains complementarities with half of its ri-
vals, but exchanges no knowledge with the other half. As in the previous strategy,
the …rm travels to half of its partners. If all …rms but j fully cooperate, then …rm j’s
cost is cj = ﬁ¡(ﬂ+￿)(N ¡1)=2: Half of the other …rms have cost ﬁ¡(ﬂ+￿)(N¡1)
and half have cost ﬁ ¡ (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡2): Computing the equilibrium for this setting
is tedious due to the existence of three di¤erent groups of …rms, each with di¤erent
costs. Nevertheless, it can be shown that equilibrium pro…ts for …rm j in this case
(gross of travel costs) are
…
T;S;W;NT =
[a¡e c + (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡1)2=2]2
b(N + 1)2 :
Note that if ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡ 1) then …T;S;W;NT > …T;W;W;NT; so if a “cheater” en-
gages in any travel, he also …nds it optimal to share information with the …rm to
whom it travels. Still, there remains the question of whether to cheat using strat-
egy (T; S; W;NT) or the strategy of total non-cooperation, (NT; W; W; NT): The
following Lemma addresses this question.
Lemma 3: In the stage game with bilateral travel, the strategy (T; S; W;NT) can
never be optimal.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is roughly that the bene…ts of sharing increase
as the square of the number of …rms with which one shares, while the travel cost of
sharing increases only linearly with the number of …rms. Hence, if it is worthwhile
to share selectively with half of one’s rivals, it must also be worthwhile to share with
all other …rms. Although the strategy of selective sharing is internally consistent,
the payo¤ structure of the game makes selective sharing a dominated strategy in the
one-shot game. We can now characterize the amount of travel that can be supported
in the stage game in the case of bilateral travel as contrasted with the case of travel
to a central location.
20Proposition 3 dB · dC:
Proof: See the Appendix.
In the stage game, knowledge exchange can be sustained over greater distance
for the case of travel to a central location. In both structures, the only feasible
cheating strategy in the stage game is total non-cooperation, e.g., withholding all
knowledge and not traveling. Although bilateral travel creates the possibility of a
wide variety of “cheating” strategies, it turns out that in the stage game all but total
non-cooperation are sub-optimal. Opportunistic plant visits cannot be e¤ective in
a one-shot game with symmetric …rms, since withholding knowledge is only optimal
if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), in which case all …rms refuse to share knowledge with others.
Selective sharing cannot be pro…table either; if ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡ 1); a …rm is better o¤
to either not travel at all or to fully cooperate, rather than to share with only half
of the other …rms. Thus, the payo¤s from cooperation and from cheating are the
same across the central location structure and the bilateral travel structure, and the
only relevant question is the travel cost associated with cooperation in each case. It
is easy to see that traveling to a central location requires less total travel than does
bilateral travel between each pair of partners, so the use of a central location supports
knowledge exchange over a greater distance in the stage game.
4.2 Knowledge Exchange in the Repeated Game
When complementarities are large, that is, when ￿ > ﬂ=(N¡1); knowledge exchange
in a repeated game occurs under the same circumstances as in the stage game. Since
selective sharing is not worthwhile, …rms either cooperate fully or not at all. Further-
more, since total non-cooperation yields the payo¤ …
ostracize; there is no short-term
gain to “cheating” on the agreement.
When complementarities are small, that is, when ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1); knowledge ex-
change never occurs in a one-shot game but exchange may nevertheless be possible in
an ongoing trading relationship. Now, however, we must consider the possibility of
a short-term gain to cheating on the agreement, which may undermine cooperation.
(Recall that in the central location structure, when complementarities are small the
cheating strategy of traveling but withholding is more pro…table than full coopera-
tion.) Full cooperation requires both traveling to meetings and sharing knowledge







Alternatively, a …rm can decide to cheat on the sharing agreement. The net










where ￿ 2 f(T; W;W; NT);(NT;W; W; NT); (T;S;W; NT); (NT; W; S; T)gindicates
the …rm’s cheating strategy, …￿ is the …rm’s …rst-period payo¤ from strategy ￿, gross




NT;W ;S;T = d(N ¡1)=2; and T
NT;W ;W;NT = 0:









coop ¡d(N ¡1) ¡…
ostracize¤
:
By rewriting this expression, we can identify the maximum distance a …rm is
willing to travel per period to sustain cooperation in this model, relative to cheating
strategy ￿. Denote this distance by D
￿
B: Note that the most pro…table cheating
strategy depends upon the magnitude of complementarities. In particular, since we
are concerned with the case of ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1); we know that a cheater prefers
strategy (T;W; W; NT) to strategy (T;S; W; NT) and to the equivalent strategy
(NT; W; S; T): Thus we can limit our consideration of short-term cheating strategies
in this case to (T;W;W; NT). The distance threshholds associated with this strategy


























22As we have noted, when complementarities are small, …rms may have incentives
to engage in opportunistic plant visits and then refuse to reciprocate with knowledge
disclosure when other …rms visit. This raises the question whether in some cir-
cumstances knowledge exchange can be better supported when …rms are located far
enough apart to discourage opportunistic plant visits. De…ne dT=W as the distance
beyond which a …rmpreferstotal non-cooperation to a strategy of opportunistic plant










(N ¡1)(ﬂ + ￿)
b(N +1)2 [2(a ¡e c) +ﬂN(N ¡1)=2] :
Is it possible that knowledge exchange can be supported for some d > dT=W but
not for d < d
T=W? This question can most easily be addressed graphically. Figure
2 shows two possible con…gurations of the relevant payo¤s and their relationship to
d when ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1): In both con…gurations, V ostracize is ‡at since it represents
the payo¤ from total non-cooperation, which involves no travel at all. The full
cooperation payo¤ is V coop, which has slope ¡(N ¡1)=(1¡–): As discussed above,
these two curves intersect at distance D
NT;W;W;NT
B = dC=(N ¡ 1): Because ￿ <
ﬂ=(N ¡1); the relevant cheating payo¤ is V T;W;W;NT: Since it involves one period in
which the cheater travels to half of the other …rms, followed by subsequent periods
with no travel, it has slope ¡(N ¡ 1)=2; and is hence much ‡atter than V coop: In
Figure 2A, parameter values are such that dT=W < dC=(N ¡ 1); so cooperation can
indeed be supported for values of d > d
T=W: However, cooperation can also be
supported for d < dT=W; since V coop > V T;W;W;NT for all d < dC=(N ¡ 1): Figure
2B represents a di¤erent set of parameters, for which V T;W ;W;NT > V coop for some
d < dC=(N ¡1): Now, however, d
T=W > dC=(N ¡1) and cooperation can only be
supported for d · D
T;W ;W;NT
B < dC=(N ¡ 1) < dT=W: Thus, in either case, it is
impossible for cooperation to be supported at some distance d > dT=W but not also
for all d < dT=W:
[Insert Figures 2A and 2B Here]
What we have shown is that it is never the case that cooperation fails at shorter
23distances butsucceeds across greaterdistances.19 We state thisresult in the following
Lemma, a formal proof of which is omitted since it follows the graphical logic just
presented.
Lemma 4: For the case of two-way travel, if knowledge exchange cannot be
supported at distance d1, then it cannot be supported for any distance d2 > d1:
We will use the notation DB as a general representation for the maximum dis-
tance across which cooperation can be sustained in the repeated game for the case of






Using this notation, we next present a comparison between DB and DC; the
distance threshold for the case of travel to a central location.
Proposition 4: For ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1); DB < DC for all –: For ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1);
DB < DC for large enough –:
Proof: See the Appendix.
An interesting implication of Proposition 4 is that the use of a central location is
notnecessarily alwaysoptimal, despite itsadvantagesin containingtravel costs. From
thisperspective, itis quite natural that industrial clusters exhibit avariety ofdi¤erent
con…gurations, as identi…ed by Markusen (1996). The proposition shows that when
complementarities are large, knowledge exchange can be supported across greater
distances with travel to a central location rather than bilateral travel. The use of a
central location economizes on total travel distance, while the incentives for cheating
on the agreement are the same under either structure. When complementarities are
small, however, there is a tradeo¤: although the use of a central location economizes
on travel costs, it also exacerbates …rms’ incentives to cheat on the agreement. The
problemwith the central location is thatacheatercan take advantage of all other…rms
at once through a strategy of traveling to the meeting but withholding knowledge.
In the case of bilateral travel, the opportunities for cheating are more restricted. A
cheater can only take advantage of the …rms to which it travels …rst. The …rms
that are …rst to travel to the cheater will learn that the cheater has refused to share
19We thank an anonymous referee for identifying an error in an earlier draft of the paper, and
suggesting that Lemma 4 is likely to be true.
24its knowledge, and as a result these …rms can reciprocate by withholding their own
knowledge when the cheater subsequently visits their facilities. It is impossible to
state in general whether the travel gains from a central location outweigh its greater
vulnerability to cheating. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 shows that as …rms become
in…nitely patient, the travel cost savings eventually become dominant, since they
accrue in every period while the cheating bene…ts accrue only in the …rst period of
cheating.
Finally, we assess how the distance threshold changes with ￿ for the case of bilat-
eral travel, as is discussed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5: For bilateral travel, @DB=@￿ ¸ @DB=@ﬂ > 0:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, in the case of bilateral travel, knowledge exchange is sustainable across
greater distances when it is more e¤ective in reducing costs, whether knowledge ex-
change is of the independent type or the complementary type. Furthermore, the
distance threshold is more responsive to increases in complementarities than to in-
creases in the value of independent knowledge. These results parallel those for the
case of travel to a central location, and reinforce our theme regarding the importance
of complementarities in knowledge exchange.
5 Conclusions
Existing theoretical work has paid scant attention to the role of spatial proximity in
facilitating knowledge exchange within clusters of technologically interlinked …rms.
In this paper, we have provided a simple model in which spatial proximity is im-
portant due to the need to exchange cost-reducing tacit knowledge via face-to-face
contact. We believe our analysis helps to clarify the factors that contribute to the
viability of innovation clusters. One factor we highlight is the importance of knowl-
edge complementarities in the sustainability of knowledge-sharing coalitions. Since
knowledge exchange is unveri…able, each …rm may have incentives to cheat on the
other members of its coalition. Nevertheless, we found that even in a one-shot game,
knowledge exchange may be an equilibrium if there is su¢cient complementarity in
the exchange process, that is, if mutual sharing produces a cost reduction beyond
what is possible simply through the discrete individual contributions of each party.
In the case of repeated trading, …rms in our model that cheat on the coalition are
25excluded from further cooperation, while the remaining members of the coalition
continue to cooperate. We …nd that the presence of greater complementarities facil-
itates the exchange of tacit knowledge, in the sense that it allows such exchange to
be sustained over greater distances.
We also …nd that the organizational structure of the industry is an important
determinant of whether knowledge exchange is viable. We consider two basic struc-
tures, one in which all …rms travel to a central location to exchange knowledge, and
one in which bilateral travel between pairs of …rms is necessary. In our model, bilat-
eral travel is necessary when tacit knowledge is embodied in organizational processes
and practices such that outsiders must actually visit the relevant facilities of each
other …rm in order to learn about them. Interestingly, we …nd that the advantages
of particular structures are related to the extent of complementarities in knowledge
exchange. When complementarities are large, knowledge exchange isfacilitated when
…rmshave the ability to meetin a central location. This may be as a result of sharing
a joint research or manufacturing facility, as was the case for the Sematech coalition
in the United States or the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. It may
also come about because the relevant knowledge is not tied to any physical facilities,
and resides independently in the minds of the …rm’s employees. In this case, it is
possible for meetings to take place at any convenient central location, such as a hotel
or conference center. When complementarities are large, this structure facilitates
knowledge exchange by economizing on travel costs. When complementarities are
small, however, a tradeo¤ emerges in the use of a central location. While the struc-
ture reduces travel costs, it is also more vulnerable to cheating than in a structure
involving bilateral travel between pairs of …rms. With a central location, a …rm
can opportunistically cheat all other …rms in the industry by traveling to the center,
passively absorbing knowledge from all its rivals, but withholding its own knowledge.
In the bilateral travel structure, however, a …rm can only cheat a subset of the other
…rms in its industry before its cheating behavior is identi…ed and punished. When
rival …rms visit the cheater before it visits them, rivals learn that the cheater is with-
holding its knowledge, and reciprocate by withholding their knowledge from it. This
makes cheating less attractive than in the central location structure.
The inter-…rm trading practices inside geographical clusters are perhaps best doc-
umented for the Silicon Valley region. Our analytical structure helps to explain how
26a cluster such as Silicon Valley maintains inter-…rm collaboration among the compet-
ing …rms given that such collaboration is inherently fragile. The Santa Clara Valley
and its surrounding towns of Mountain View, San Jose and Sunnyvale are home to
several densely located groups of specialized …rms, mainly in the semiconductor in-
dustry. For example, as is shown in Angel and Scott(1987), the geographical location
of the specialized semiconductor establishments in Silicon Valley displays a close-knit
functional distribution among the circuit design establishments, mask-makers, inde-
pendent test facilities, device assembly houses and other ancillary subcontractors.
Such observations provide anecdotal evidence on the signi…cance of spatial proximity
in linking clusters of …rmswith complementary products and technologies. According
to TomFurlong, manager of DEC’s work station group in Palo Alto: “An engineering
teamsimply can notwork with another engineering teamthat is three thousand miles
away, unless the task is incredibly explicit and well-de…ned—which they rarely are.
If you are not tripping over the guy, you are not working with him, or not working
at the level that you optimally could if you co-located.”20
Considerable work remains to be done incorporating spatial proximity and knowl-
edge complementarities into economic analysis of knowledge exchange. On the the-
oretical side, one step would be to include explicitly in our model investments in
research and development that generate the knowledge to be exchanged. Another
would be to incorporate distance and complementarities in a social network approach,
by modeling in detail the formation of links between …rms that allow for knowledge
sharing, and assessing the equilibrium structure of such networks. A third would be
to blend our model of knowledge sharing within coalitions with models of information
transmission via job mobility, with the aim of providing a more comprehensive pic-
ture of information transmission within clusters. On the empirical side, detailed …eld
studies of collaboration within clusters would be valuable. If documented carefully,
they could provide the foundation for econometric research on spatial proximity and
knowledge complementarities, and their role in knowledge exchange.
20See Saxenian (1996), p. 157.
27Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of all lemmas and propositions. First, however, we
present expressions for several derivatives that are used in proofs at various places in
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Lemma 1: Suppose all …rms engage in meetings with one another. If knowledge
complementarities are small, i.e. ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), then the only Nash equilibrium
28for the remainder of the stage game is for all …rms to withhold their knowledge. If
knowledge complementarities are large, i.e. if ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), then there are two
Nash equilibria, one with no knowledge sharing and one with knowledge sharing by all
…rms.
Proof: De…ne Z = a ¡ ﬁ + (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡ 1). Then …coop = Z2=[b(N + 1)2] is the
per-…rm payo¤ if all …rms cooperate in sharing knowledge. Combining some terms
we …nd that the payo¤ to a …rm that cheats on the cooperative arrangement is
…cheat = [Z + (N ¡ 1)(ﬂ ¡ ￿(N ¡ 1))]2=[b(N + 1)2]. Then it is easy to show that
refusing to share when all other …rms share is pro…table if and only if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1):
In this case, the unique Nash equilibrium in the subgame involves no sharing of
knowledge.
If ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡ 1), then the foregoing logic implies that knowledge sharing is an
equilibrium. Nevertheless, there also exists a no-sharing equilibrium. If all …rms
withhold knowledge, then pro…ts for each …rm are …withhold = (a ¡ ﬁ)2=[b(N + 1)2]:
If …rm j decides to share information when all others withhold, then its cost remains
cj = ﬁ while all other …rms have cost ci = ﬁ ¡ﬂ. Thus, …rm j’s pro…ts are …Donate =
[a¡Nﬁ+(N ¡1)(ﬁ ¡ﬂ)]
2=[b(N +1)





Proposition 1: For travel to a central location, knowledge exchange is an equi-
librium in the repeated game if
d < DC =
(







if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1)
:
Proof: If ￿ ¸ ﬂ=(N¡1); inspection reveals that the maximumdistance for which
cooperation can be supported in the repeated game in this case is just the same as

























29Proposition 2: For travel to a central location, @DC=@￿ ¸ @DC=@ﬂ > 0:
Furthermore, @DC=@￿ and @DC=@ﬂ are greater for ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1) than for ￿ >
ﬂ=(N ¡1):

























> 0 if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1)
;
where the expressions for the partial derivatives on the right-hand side, along with
their signs, are presented at the beginning of the Appendix. Thus, knowledge ex-
change is sustainable across greater distances when complementarities increase. Fur-
thermore, since itisclear by inspection of the equations atthe outset of the Appendix
that d…W=T=d￿ < d…ostracize=d￿ < 0, and since – · 1; it is easy to show that DC is
concave in ￿:
Matters are similar but a bit more complex when we consider comparative statics

























if ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1)
:
For the case of ￿ ¸ ﬂ=(N ¡1); a glance at the beginning of the Appendix shows
@DC=@ﬂ = @DC=@￿ > 0: For ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1); note that @…W=T=@ﬂ > 0; so the the
sign of @DC=@ﬂ is not obvious in general for this case. However, it is easy to see that
for the case of large –; which is our interest, @DC=@ﬂ > 0 for ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1): Since
@…W=T=@ﬂ > 0 > @…ostracize=@ﬂ; it is clear that @DC=@ﬂ is greater for ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1)
than for ￿ > ﬂ=(N¡1): Finally, since @…
W=T=@ﬂ > 0 > @…
W=T=@￿; while @…
coop=@ﬂ =
@…coop=@￿ and @…ostracize=@ﬂ = @…ostracize=@￿; it is clear that @DC=@￿ ¸ @DC=@ﬂ:
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: In the stage game with bilateral travel, the strategy (T; S; W;NT) can
never be optimal.
Proof: De…ne R = a ¡e c; S = 1=b(N + 1)2, and T = (ﬂ + ￿)(N ¡ 1)2: Then
…ostracize = R2=S; …coop = (R+T)2=S; and …T;S;W;NT = (R+T=2)2=S: Thus (…coop ¡
30…T;S;W;NT) = (RT + 3T 2=4)=S > (…T;S;W;NT ¡ …ostracize) = (RT + T 2=4)=S: The
travel cost required to obtain payo¤ …T;S;W;NT is d(N ¡ 1)=2 and the incremental
travel cost required to move all the way up to …coop is also d(N ¡ 1)=2: Then if
…T;S;W;NT ¡…ostracize > d(N ¡1)=2 it must also be the case that …coop ¡…T;S;W;NT >
d(N ¡1)=2: Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 dB · dC:
Proof: If ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡ 1); then dC = dB = 0: If ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡ 1); then Lemma 3
shows that the only relevant comparison is between full cooperation and total non-
cooperation. As a result, we simply compare dC = 2[…coop ¡…ostracize] > dB =
[…coop ¡…ostracize] =(N ¡1): Q.E.D.
Proposition 4: For ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1); DB < DC for all –: For ￿ < ﬂ=(N ¡1);
DB < DC for large enough –:
Proof: For ￿ > ﬂ=(N ¡1); the relevant comparison is between full cooperation
and total non-cooperation, just as in the stage game. As a result, we simply compare
dC = 2[…coop ¡…ostracize] > dB = […coop ¡…ostracize]=(N ¡1):























To compare these expressions, note that …
W;T > …
T;W ;W;NT; since the former in-
volves cheating all (N ¡ 1) other …rms, while the latter involves cheating only half
of them. At the same time, 2=– > 2=((N ¡ 1)(1 + –)) for all N > 2: Thus
it is impossible to make a general comparison for all values of –: Nevertheless,
for large enough –; the bracketed expressions in each distance threshhold can be




C because 2=((N ¡1)(1+ –)) <
2=–: Q.E.D.
Proposition 5: For bilateral travel, @DB=@￿ ¸ @DB=@ﬂ > 0:




B g; it is su¢cient to show that
the derivative on each component of DB is positive. Di¤erentiating with respect to








































B =@ﬂ. However, the resultsatthe outsetof the Appendixshow@…T;W;W;NT=@￿ <
@…T;W ;W;NT=@ﬂ < 0; so@D
T;W ;W;NT
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Figure 1: Distance Threshold and ComplementaritiesVcoop
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Figure 2B: Distance and Cooperation with Bilateral Travel
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